This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear missile silos, ballistic missile submarines, and nuclear bombers kept at fail-safe points) and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. Proponents of MAD as part of the US and USSR strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full-scale nuclear exchange as a functioning state. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the MAD doctrine continues to be applied. It was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike capability. The primary application of this doctrine started during the Cold War (1940s to 1991), in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. Emerging domains of cyber-espionage, proxy-state conflict, and high-speed missiles threaten to circumvent MAD as a deterrent strategy. However, many have argued that mutually assured destruction is unable to deter unconventional war that could later escalate. The payoff of the MAD doctrine was and still is expected to be a tense but stable global peace. The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side would launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with surviving forces (a second strike), resulting in unacceptable losses for both parties. The same principle is invoked against missile defense. If one side constructed a similar system of shelters, it would violate the MAD doctrine and destabilize the situation, because it would have less to fear from a second strike.
The doctrine requires that neither side construct shelters on a massive scale.
The expected result is an immediate, irreversible escalation of hostilities resulting in both combatants' mutual, total, and assured destruction. Either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. Under MAD, each side has enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the other side. ( October 2013) ( Learn how and when to remove this template message) Please help to improve this section by introducing more precise citations. This section includes a list of general references, but it remains largely unverified because it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations.
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